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ABSTRACT
How do labor markets adjust to trade liberalization? Leading models of intraindustry trade (Krugman
(1981), Melitz (2003)) assume homogeneous workers and full employment, and thus predict that all
workers win from trade liberalization, a conclusion at odds with the public debate. Our paper develops
a new model that merges Melitz (2003) with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), so also links product market
churning to labor market churning. Workers care about their jobs because the model features aggregate
unemployment and jobs that pay different wages to identical workers. Simulations show that, for reasonable
parameter values, as many as one-fourth of existing "good jobs" (those with above average wage)
may be destroyed in a liberalization. This is true even as the model shows minimal impact on aggregate
unemployment and quite substantial aggregate gains from trade.
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How do labor markets adjust to trade liberalization? Three points motivate our approach 
to this question. The first is empirical. Most of trade is intra-industry trade and recent experience 
of large liberalizations suggests that the greater part of adjustment is likewise reallocation within 
rather than between industries. The second is a point of analysis. Recent theoretical advances that 
emphasize the role of firm heterogeneity and product market churning also underscore the 
importance of considering labor market churning in trade liberalization episodes. The third 
motivation is again empirical. While job rents appear to be more modest than they appeared in 
some early studies, they remain substantial for some workers and this could be a source of 
resistance to trade reform.  
We develop a model that integrates these elements. Building on Melitz (2003), our model 
is focused on within industry reallocation, and so is relevant for the bulk of trade and the nature 
of the most significant trade reforms. Linking this with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency 
wages at the firm level, there is equilibrium unemployment and jobs have firm specific rents 
attached, the latter implying that workers distinguish between good and bad jobs. Selection 
effects now depend both on firm physical productivities and firm wages. Since our model also 
features the product market churning of Melitz, it likewise features labor market churning. 
However, unlike in Melitz, job rents and the existence of unemployment mean that workers care 
about job loss, particularly the loss of good jobs.  
We go on to develop a simulation of this economy, with key parameters chosen where 
possible to match existing empirical estimates, and study liberalization episodes that constitute 
transitions to Anderson and Van Wincoop’s (2003) preferred estimate of actual level of trade 
integration as well as the case corresponding to the removal of all trade barriers. Trade raises 
aggregate real income substantially, and the level of unemployment is at plausible magnitudes 
and is little affected by liberalization. However there is considerable product and labor market 
churning. With the removal of all border barriers, trade leads to the gross destruction of up to 
one-fourth of all “good” (above average wage) jobs.  
Our approach builds on a sustained dialogue about the consequences of trade 
liberalization for labor markets. Traditional comparative advantage models highlight the 
potential disruptiveness of trade liberalization, which would require inter-industry reallocation of 
labor. Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz type models, by contrast, emphasized that the gains from   2
international exchange of varieties could exist with literally zero re-allocation of labor. The 
empirical literature is at odds with both hypotheses. Instead, actual trade liberalizations are 
associated with considerable labor re-allocation, but this takes place primarily within rather than 
between industries.  
This observation accords well with the heterogeneous firm paradigm of Melitz, in which 
product market churning of firms has as a consequence labor market churning of jobs. However, 
the Melitz model fares less well in another dimension. Key characteristics of the labor market in 
Melitz include the homogeneity of workers and jobs. All workers are the same, all jobs are the 
same, and there is full employment. Hence, while there is a churning of jobs, workers do not care 
about the churning per se, but just enjoy the gains available to all workers. This would be a world 
in which trade liberalization is uncontroversial, quite unlike the world in which we actually 
reside.  
  Our paper is one among a set that aim to reconsider the labor market side of trade 
liberalization. Related papers include Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman and Itskhoki 
(2010), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010), and Felbermayr, et al. (2008).  
The central message of our paper is simple. The new heterogeneous firm models place 
essentially all of the weight of gains from trade on the efficiency effects of firm selection. The 
consequent product market churning has a counterpart in labor market churning. If there is 
unemployment and if, in addition, some jobs carry empirically relevant rents, then the presence 
of aggregate gains does not preclude the existence of distributional conflicts between the 
employed and the unemployed and between workers with good and bad jobs. In contrast to the 
first generation models of intra-industry exchange, in the new models such distributional conflict 
is to be expected.  
II. Unemployment, Efficiency Wages, and the Firm 
A. Shapiro-Stiglitz with Heterogeneous Firm Level Monitoring and Iceberg Effort Costs 
  In considering employment relations, we follow the efficiency wage model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), amending this as needed to mesh with the firm-based model of Melitz 
(2003).  
  In the Shapiro and Stiglitz  model, firms can monitor worker effort only imperfectly. 
Workers’ distaste for effort tempts them to shirk, and they are deterred in equilibrium by the 
possibility that their shirking will be discovered and they will be fired. Unemployment persists in   3
equilibrium because the wage that firms offer is too high to clear the labor market. 
Unemployment is bad news for workers, and truly involuntary, in the sense that employed 
workers are ex ante identical to the unemployed yet have higher utility. The market failure is that 
workers cannot credibly commit to effort at less than the going wage. Our model has all these 
features, with the crucial difference that firms differ in their ability to detect shirking.  
  There is a large literature that tests various aspects of the Shapiro-Stiglitz and other 
efficiency wage models, but there is no paper that directly tests the prediction that monitoring 
ability and high wages are substitute means to elicit effort. There are a number of papers, 
including Groshen and Krueger (1990), Rebitzer (1995), and Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders and 
Taylor (2002) that use exogenous variation in monitoring intensity to confirm that effort does 
indeed increase in monitoring intensity.
2 There is also a literature that documents industry wage 
differentials (for example, Krueger and Summers (1988)). Such differentials have no direct 
connection to efficiency wage theory, but they are consistent with labor rents of the sort that 
obtain in the equilibrium of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.  
  Workers are infinitely lived, risk neutral, and discount the future at rate r . Subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint, they maximize: 
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 , where  i W  is the nominal wage at firm i and P  
is the aggregate price index (developed below). 
  Depending on the employment and effort status of a worker, utility takes the following 
forms:  
   , Uw e w        if the worker shirks 




     if the worker exerts effort. 
  U = 0        if the worker is unemployed 
                                                 
2 We have also observed a positive relationship between monitoring intensity and homework effort by resident 
adolescents. We believe that such an effect is well-known to other parents.   4
Here the cost of effort e is modeled as an “iceberg” cost that shrinks the perceived real wage of 
the worker, although of course not shrinking the nominal wage paid by firms and received by 
workers (both of which treat the aggregate price index P  as given).
3 
  Workers lose their job only if the firm dies or they are caught shirking. Firm death 
happens at an exogenous rate . We assume that no firm monitors effort perfectly. If workers at 
firm i were to shirk, they would face a hazard  0, i mm    of detection, where m reflects the 
monitoring ability of the firm most proficient at monitoring. If detected shirking, workers face 
the penalty of being fired and spending time in unemployment before finding a new job.  
  Workers at firm i have fundamental asset equations that reflect their status as shirkers or 
non-shirkers. Let 
S
Ei V  and 
N
Ei V  be the expected lifetime utility respectively of shirkers and non-
shirkers currently employed at firmi. Let  U V be the expected lifetime utility of a worker currently 
unemployed (noting that this is independent of any firm because unemployed workers are 
unattached).  
  Then the fundamental asset equations for employed non-shirkers and shirkers 
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  These consist of the flow real wage benefits,   / o r   ii we w  respectively, plus an expected 
capital loss in case of a shift to unemployment, where the instantaneous probabilities differ 
because shirkers face a higher likelihood of a move to unemployment due to firm  's i  monitoring 
i m  for shirking. This departs from the conventional Shapiro-Stiglitz framework in allowing for 
firm specificity in monitoring ability, the wage, and the value of employment at a particular firm.  
                                                 
3 The iceberg cost of effort, U=w/e, departs from the traditional Shapiro-Stiglitz formulation of the cost of effort as 
U=w-e. This responds to the critique by David Romer (2006) that the conventional formulation would give rise to a 
secular trend in unemployment. A consequence is that the aggregate price index P is simply a scale variable in 
Equation (1). Moreover, changes in P, for example due to trade liberalization, will not directly affect the balance of 
incentives to work or shirk, since it affects them proportionately (cf. Steven Matusz (1996)). The new formulation 
also has the important consequence for us, developed below, that the ranking of firms by marginal cost is a function 
only of firm-specific parameters, hence invariant to the liberalization episodes we consider.    5
 Firm  i recognizes the incentive to shirk. Hence in light of these incentives and its own 
monitoring ability, it chooses a wage sufficient to induce employees to work rather than shirk. 
This requires:   
(4)    
N S
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  The firm chooses to meet this non-shirking constraint with equality (so 
NS
Ei Ei Ei VVV ). 
We can solve this for the firm-level equivalent of the Shapiro-Stiglitz no-shirking constraint: 
(5)    1( ) ˆ
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Since  U V  is independent of firm identity, wages will vary across firms only due to monitoring 
ability and equilibrium wages decline with improvements in monitoring. Note as well that this is 
a notional wage. That is, this is the wage required of a firm with monitoring ability  i m  if it is to 
elicit effort, and is well defined although in equilibrium not all firms will survive.
4  
  These allow us to have a precise definition of the utility cost of job loss for a worker at 
firm i:  





    
 
This is always positive, which means job loss is costly to workers and that unemployment is 
truly involuntary. Moreover, the utility cost of job loss varies across firms, being high where the 
wage distortion  / ii Wm is high.  
  We can also return to the firm-specific real wages in Equation (5) and consider it for any 









That is, the firm-specific real and nominal wages are in a constant ratio that depends inversely on 
the firm-level relative monitoring abilities as well as common parameters. With firm level 
physical marginal productivities also constant (as developed below), we arrive at the conclusion 
                                                 
4 Equation (5) requires the parameter restriction:    /( ) 1 i mr e    . The left-hand side is the hazard rate of 
detection relative to the discounted hazard of losing your job anyway. This must exceed the utility penalty of effort. 
As long as workers are patient, exogenous job loss isn’t too likely, or effort isn’t too costly, this restriction will be 
satisfied.   6
that relative marginal costs across firms will be constant. That is, firms can be ordered according 
to their marginal costs even before we have developed other elements of the equilibrium.  
  Assume that there is some firm type with the best available monitoring technology, given 
by  1 mm   . We will choose the wage paid at the best monitoring firm as our numéraire, so 
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which is greater than one for   0, i mm   and decreasing in  i m . Firms pay a wage premium 
relative to that of the firm with the best monitoring technology, a premium that decreases as their 
monitoring improves. Although the nominal wage schedule is fixed, real wages of course are free 
to move with changes in the aggregate price index P . This nominal wage schedule will play a 
central role when we turn to the Melitz side of our model.  
 
B. Aggregation 
  The next step is to connect wages to unemployment. For this we need an equilibrium 
density of the wages paid by active firms f(W), to be derived later, and which will be common 
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 will play a crucial role in what follows. 
  We are now ready to consider the flow benefits of being unemployed. Since unemployed 
workers receive no income, the flow benefits consist entirely of the expected capital gain from 
re-employment. Let b be the instantaneous probability of re-employment of an unemployed 
worker. Then the fundamental asset equation for an unemployed worker is:   7
(10)    UE U rV b V V   
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  The hazard rate of re-employment of an unemployed worker, b, can be examined in 
terms of the steady state, which requires that flows into and out of unemployment be equal. Let L 
be the total size of the labor force and let U  be the total number of unemployed. In equilibrium 
separations happen at rate  . Then the steady state imposes that: 
   bU L U    
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Substituting (13) into the individual firm’s no-shirking constraint (5). we find:  
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This no-shirking constraint is a key link between the macro variables u and 
*
/ Wm.  
  We now focus on Equation (14) for the best monitoring firm 1, whose nominal wage 
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so the unemployment rate is strictly between 0 and 1, as required.  
  Equation (15) is central to the macro side of our model. Consider this first for a given 
wage distortion 
*
/ Wm.  Unemployment is then increasing in both the death rate of jobs   as   8
well as the utility cost of effort e. Each shifts the balance of benefits against effort, the first 
because expected job tenure declines and the second because the utility derived from non-
shirking employment declines.  
  We can also look at (15) for given  1 A , so focusing on 
*
/ Wm. From the Shapiro-
Stiglitz side of our model, the average wage distortion must be computed across all active jobs. 
As in Helpman, Itskhokhi, Redding (2010), we abstract from wage distortions in the fixed costs, 
here by assuming that monitoring costs in these activities are common at all firms and for 
simplicity setting this equal to those of the best monitoring activity, i.e. m , so the associated 
wage is unity. Looking inside any single firm, all fixed cost activities have a wage distortion of 
 1/m , while marginal cost activities have a wage distortion of   / ii Wm. As we show in the 
next section, in response to trade liberalization there will be two sources of changes in the 
average wage distortion. The first is within the firm, due to the fact that the mix of fixed and 
marginal activities changes. The second is the redistribution of these activities across firms, as 
some expand output to reach new markets, others contract and serve only the domestic market, 
while others exit, in addition to the fact that the steady state mass of entry will adjust. From 
Equation (9), the capital gain associated with moving out of unemployment rises with the 
average wage distortion 
*
/ Wm.  In this case, unemployment becomes less daunting and effort 
will be forthcoming only if there is a higher unemployment rate u, which explains the positive 
association of these variables in Equation (15).  
  The development to this point has assumed that workers discount the future at rate r > 0. 
When we turn to integrating our labor market model with the Melitz model, we will take the 
limiting case where r  0, to be consistent with his assumption that firms do not discount the 
future. By inspection of Equations (8) and (15), focusing on this limiting case has no 
implications for the key results of this section.  
   In summary, we have developed a Shapiro-Stiglitz model with heterogeneity in firm 
monitoring and iceberg costs of effort. This model yields two key relations that carry over to the 
Melitz side of our model. The first is a schedule of nominal wages relative to that paid by the 
most proficient monitoring firm. This pins down firm marginal costs. A second key macro 
relation is between the no-shirking unemployment rate and the average firm distortion, defined 
as the employment-weighted average ratio of the nominal firm wage to its monitoring ability.   9
That ratio emerges endogenously from the Melitz side of the model and so determines the 
equilibrium unemployment rate.  
 
III. The Product Market 
  A. The Consumer’s Problem 
  Preferences over goods are identical and homothetic.  The representative consumer 
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We also have 
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where QV  and P  is an aggregate price index given by 
(16) 
1
1 1 () Pp i d i
         
The associated revenues for the producer of an individual variety from this consumer are: 
(17) 
11 () () ri R P pi
     
These revenues depend both on aggregate values, 
1 RP
 , as well as the firm choice of  () p i . 
 
  B. The Producer’s Problem  
  Firms face a sequence of problems.  There is an unbounded mass of potential firms.  In 
the first stage, a mass  e M  of firms will enter, pay a fixed entry cost of  e f , and receive 
information about their type.  Here a firm’s type is represented by the pair  , ii m   covering both 
productivity and monitoring ability in variable costs.  We saw above in Equation (8) that there is 
a simple relation between equilibrium no-shirking wages and monitoring.  This means that the 
firm can immediately translate the productivity-monitoring draw   , ii m   to a productivity-  10
nominal-wage draw  , ii W  .  In Melitz (2003), it is productivity  that determines firm 
performance.  We show below that the determinant of performance in our model is productivity 
adjusted for the firm-specific wage, which we denote as  ii i zW   .  Here  i z  can be thought of 
equivalently as the inverse marginal cost for firm i.  
  We consider now the problem of an individual firm that has already sunk the cost  e f  to 
learn its inverse marginal cost  i z . Having learned its  i z , firm i will produce if its variable profits 
cover its per period fixed costs  f ; otherwise it will exit before producing. Physical labor 
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Note that firm level physical labor demand requires knowledge of  i   (not only  i z ), so must be 
recovered to establish labor market equilibrium once the structure of the economy (including the 
wage bill for a firm of type  i z ) is determined.  
Costs also depend on the wages paid to workers in fixed cost activities.  Our focus on the 
Melitz approach requires that the only locus of firm level variation is in marginal costs. Hence 
we assume that the firm pays a wage  1 f W   for labor employed in any of its fixed costs and a 
wage  i W  for labor employed in its variable costs
5.  
  For given macro variables, a particular firm i thus faces a demand curve as defined in the 
consumer’s problem above and chooses output to maximize profits, 
(19)    ii ii
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Prices and maximized profits vary across firms only because of variation in  i z .  That is, firms 
with a common inverse marginal cost z  may be paying different nominal wages, and employing 
                                                 
5 This asymmetry between wages paid in fixed and marginal costs is for analytical convenience only, and is directly 
analagous to Melitz’s assumption that firms differ only in their marginal and not their fixed costs. An alternative 
modeling choice would be to specify a second, constant returns sector, and have fixed costs paid in units of that 
sector, as for example in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008a).     11
different amounts of labor, but they charge the same price, will produce the same quantity, and 
have the same revenue, wage bill, and profits. Hence we will drop the subscript i henceforth 
except as necessary to clarify limits of integration or when it is necessary to specify physical 
labor demand.  
 
  C. The Marginal Firm and Equilibrium Structure of the Economy 
  The combination of a primitive distribution on   ,m   and the equilibrium nominal wage 
from the labor market in Equation (8) allows us to derive the joint distribution for  ,W  . 
Knowledge of this joint distribution allows us as well to calculate the distribution of inverse 
marginal costs z with cumulative distribution function    () P r Gz Z z    and density  ( ) gz. The 
full equilibrium will feature a cutoff level of inverse marginal cost,  * z , such that firms with 
* zz   exit immediately upon learning of their draw.  
 Given  ( ) gz, we can also define the equilibrium density of active firms: 
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.  
  Equilibrium structure in an autarkic Melitz economy is determined by the solution of two 
relations between average profits   and the wage-adjusted productivity of the marginal entrant 
* z . The first of these two relations is a free entry condition (FE), which asserts that from an 
unbounded set of ex ante identical firms, a sufficient mass enters so that the average profits from 
entry equal the fixed cost of entry. The FE condition is essentially identical to that of Melitz: 









 (ZCP)  (FE) 
  The second key relation is the Zero Cutoff Productivity (ZCP), which defines the 
marginal active firm: 





   (ZCP) 
As in Melitz, the intersection of the FE and the ZCP curves determines the equilibrium marginal 
entrant  * z . The equilibrium exists and is unique under the same conditions.    12
IV. General Equilibrium 
 The  equilibrium  * z  completely determines the structure of the economy, including 
output, revenue, employment, and profit for each firm. We now need to go on to recover the 
average wage distortion, determine the associated unemployment rate consistent with no-
shirking, and thus determine the mass of firms that provides for equilibrium in the labor market.  
  A. Unemployment and Labor Market Equilibrium 
  We showed in Equation (15) that the unemployment rate is an increasing function of the 







. In computing the average wage distortion, we account for the 
fact that workers in fixed cost activities are paid a wage of 1, while workers in variable cost 
activities are paid a wage given by (8).  Employment in active firms is given by (18). Let 
 | iz 
  denote the density of active firms, where    , iW    identifies a firm type. This density 
depends on the primitive joint density of   ,W   as well as the cutoff  z
determined in the 
previous section. The employment-weighted average wage distortion in the economy per unit 
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Plugging (20) into (15) delivers the equilibrium unemployment rate. With the unemployment 
rate determined, the equilibrium mass of firms M is determined by setting employed labor equal 
to labor demand, 
(21) 
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The mass of active firms plus their prices allow us to establish the aggregate price index 
P  as in Melitz. Aggregate income equals total wages and likewise equals total spending
6.   This 
completes the specification of our model. 
  B. Trade and Selection Effects 
In this section, we describe elements of the trading equilibrium that will be relevant for the 
discussions in subsequent sections. As before, key elements of equilibrium will be determined by 
                                                 
6 Unlike in Melitz, nominal national income is not simply equal to the size of the labor force.   13
the intersection of two curves. The first is the Free Entry curve, which is defined so that ex ante 
profits are zero, hence ties each potential cutoff z with an expected profit level  . This curve is 
entirely unchanged in a move from autarky to costly trade. The second is the Zero Cutoff 
Productivity (ZCP) curve which lies above the autarky ZCP curve for the same reasons as in 
Melitz.  This implies that the equilibrium cutoff  * z  must rise.  That is, our model will feature 
the same kind of selection effects as in Melitz and for exactly the same reason – i.e. the new 
opportunities available to exporters and the new pressures from import competition. Given  * z , 
the cutoff for exporting  x z
 is also found as in Melitz.  With these cutoffs, we can calculate the 
new  /* Wm , hence also determine the unemployment rate. With these in hand, we can return 
to recover all other variables in the trading equilibrium.  
  C. Monitoring, Productivity, and the Size-Wage Correlation 
  Unlike Melitz (2003), our model features two dimensions of random heterogeneity across 
firms, productivity and monitoring ability m, and so far we have made no assumptions about 
the ex ante correlation between them.  Heterogeneity in m delivers heterogeneity in wages W 
through equation (8), which determines each firm’s inverse marginal cost zW   .  Firm size 
(measured by sales) in our model is a monotonic function of z, which implies that for a given   
that high-wage firms will be smaller. This is at variance with the data, which instead shows a 
positive correlation between wages and firm size (see Brown and Medoff (1989), Idson and Oi 
(1999) and Manning (2003), among others). Since the size-wage correlation is an important 
empirical aspect of firm heterogeneity, here we provide some discussion of how it fits into our 
framework.  
  In our model, even if the ex ante correlation between  and m is zero, the Melitz-style 
selection effects will tend to induce an ex post positive correlation between  and W.  This is 
because competition will force the exit of high marginal cost firms, i.e. those with high W but 
low .  Thus a positive size-wage correlation is possible in our model even with no ex ante   14
correlation between  and m.  However, in our numerical simulations below it turns out that a 
small  negative ex ante correlation between productivity and monitoring ability is needed to get 
the simulated size-wage correlation to match the empirical evidence.  Thus while we do not 
model the determinants of monitoring at the firm level, it is worth looking more closely at the 
issue.  
  Mehta (1998) provides an account of the size-wage distribution that, while not developed 
in the context of the Melitz model, nonetheless meshes quite naturally with it.  Mehta 
emphasizes the crucial role of hierarchy in production, so he distinguishes managers from 
workers.  Managers have two tasks.  One is to monitor the effort of workers and the other is to 
engage in coordination of workers in ways that raise productivity.  Large firms pair managers 
with increasing numbers of workers.  This increased span of control for the manager leads the 
manager to substitute higher wages for monitoring as a way to elicit effort.  While modeling of 
this trade-off is beyond the scope of our paper, we can easily think of the manager in the Melitz 
context as the residual claimant to profits at the firm.  Thus, in reduced form, the approach of 
Mehta is captured in the assumption in some of the numerical exercises below that monitoring 
efficiency is inversely related to productivity. 
  Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) also provide a model of heterogeneous firms that 
in equilibrium has a positive firm size-wage correlation.  While their labor market mechanism is 
quite different from ours, the motivation of their production structure that gives rise to the firm 
size-wage correlation is quite similar to Mehta’s and ours: managerial time is a fixed factor, so 
managers supervise each worker less intensively in larger organizations. 
 
V. Trade Liberalization 
  This section will consider the consequences for firms and workers of trade liberalization 
in our model.  We divide our discussion of a move from autarky to freer trade into two pieces. 
The first will consider the case of a liberalization that affects the structure of the economy, i.e. 
the equilibrium marginal cost cutoff, but not its scale, i.e. the average wage distortion,  
*
/ Wm, 
which determines the equilibrium unemployment rate.  Depending on the primitive distribution 
of productivity and monitoring  ,m  , our model is consistent with either a rise or fall in this 
average wage distortion with liberalization.  As a base case, we begin by assuming that   15
liberalization has no impact on this average wage distortion. This implies that the structure of the 
economy will change, but not its scale.  Once the analysis of a change in structure is complete, 
we go on to consider how we would need to amend the conclusions of that analysis once we 
allow for changes in scale as well.  
  The analysis in this section, in formal terms, is comparative steady state analysis.  A 
complete analysis of the time path of adjustment would be required to make definitive statements 
about welfare and political economy.  That is beyond the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, the 
basic nature of the adjustments required along the path to the new steady state does emerge from 
our model.  We believe that this provides a powerful heuristic for understanding the forces at 
work in identifying winners and losers, hence also in understanding the political economy of 
liberalization.  
  A. Changes in Structure Only 
  We consider here the special case in which our economies move from autarky to freer 
trade, but in which the average wage distortion, hence also aggregate employment, is unchanged. 
This implies that the analysis of the structure of firms’ price and output decisions in the product 
market, as well as profit, entry and exit, will be precisely as in Melitz, so long as we use our own 
measure of inverse marginal cost, given by z. Here, though, workers have attachments to specific 
firms because of rents created by differences at the firm level in wages.  
  We can use Figure 1 to think about the comparison of autarky and freer trade as it affects 
profits of firms and employment of workers. The lowest feasible wage is that associated with the 
best monitoring firm and equals one by choice of numéraire. A ray from the origin is also a 
constant marginal cost curve. The ray labeled 
*
a mc  indicates the highest level of marginal cost 
consistent with zero post-entry profits in autarky, and thus defines the cutoff for active firms. 
Firms with lower marginal costs are to the southeast of the 
*
a mc  ray, and firm size is 
monotonically decreasing in marginal cost.  
  The impact of the shift in comparative steady states from autarky to trade gives rise to 
three additional critical values in inverse marginal costs. The first is 
* mc , the marginal entrant 
under freer trade. Next is  x mc , the marginal exporter. Finally is mc , the highest marginal cost 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately even knowledge of movements in the average nominal wage would not suffice to determine the 
qualitative change in the average wage distortion, as they need not be monotonically related.    16
for which a firm sees its profits rise with freer trade. Accordingly, these boundaries define 
Regions I to IV in the figure.  
  The impact of trade on firms’ profits and output is straightforward. All firms in Region I 
exit with trade, so their profits and output fall to zero. Firms in Regions II and III also see a 
decline in profits. For firms in Region II, the entry of foreign firms into their home market 
reduces their domestic demand and profits, yet leaves them incapable of finding a sufficient 
foreign market to justify the fixed costs of exporting. Output for these firms declines. It is 
notable that firms in Region III suffer a decline in profits in spite of the fact that they not only 
survive in the domestic market but also find a foreign market for their products; the losses in the 
home market are not fully compensated by the new profits in the export market. Total output for 
these firms expands and so the decline in profits is attached to the fixed cost of entering the 
export market. Only the largest firms, those in Region IV, find that their profits rise with trade. 
Notably, firms can find their way into Region IV either by their inherent productivity or by 
effective monitoring of workers, which allows them to elicit effort at low wages.  
  The analysis of the impact on workers is only slightly more complex. We have set aside 
until the next subsection any impact of trade on the average wage distortion and equilibrium 
unemployment. The nominal wage of a worker who maintains employment at a specific firm is 
determined by the firm specific monitoring technology and parameters of the model, so is 
unaffected by trade liberalization.  
  This leaves only two channels for trade to affect workers. The first, as in Melitz, is that 
liberalization lowers the typical price and may raise total variety of products available to workers 
qua consumers. This benefits all workers and should be considered as a potential offset to losses 
incurred by some workers.  
  The second channel for trade to affect workers here is via changes in employment, which 
is most directly related to the fate of firms in the output market. We have already seen that firms 
in Region I exit the market, hence all workers at these firms lose their jobs. Firms in Region II 
contract their output, hence workers at these firms may be seen as facing a probability of job loss 
related to the degree of contraction. Firms in Regions III and IV expand employment sufficiently 
in the new steady state to provide precisely the same number of new jobs as those lost via firings 
among firms in Regions I and II.    17
  Workers at firms in Regions III and IV should expect to be unambiguously better off with 
the move from autarky to freer trade. The firms there are expanding output, so should have no 
unusual layoffs. They also enjoy gains from lower average prices and possibly increased variety.  
  The situation is more intricate for workers initially with firms in Regions I and II. As 
noted, on one side are the common price index gains from liberalization. On the other side is the 
certainty (Region I) or probability (Region II) of job loss. In the model workers must pass 
through a period of unemployment before finding new employment. Since workers always prefer 
to be employed rather than unemployed, this is a cost. The magnitude of the cost of a job loss is 
higher the higher the initial wage. While we don’t have an explicit model of the transition 
between steady states, trade liberalization creates a great deal of turnover while costing zero net 
jobs. This should be good news for those currently unemployed, who are happy to accept any job 
on offer and suddenly find a lot of hiring going on, even though the transition would require 
more people to pass through unemployment.  
  This analysis also provides a window on the debate over whether trade liberalization 
threatens “good jobs”. A precise way to state the consequences for jobs here is that liberalization 
destroys jobs with high marginal costs of production. Sometimes these are low wage jobs with 
very low productivity; sometimes they are high wage jobs with productivity that may be high but 
is not quite high enough to secure the jobs.  
  However, there is another – from a worker’s perspective, quite natural – way to interpret 
the consequences of the shocks. This is to hold fixed the type of firm, indexed by its productivity 
, and compare what happens to different types of jobs at comparable firms defined in this way. 
Figure 2 provides a simple window on this way of looking at the world. To the previous diagram, 
Figure 2 adds the average wage in autarky,  a W , and a specific productivity level  0  , which for 
illustrative purposes was chosen to intersect the average wage line at the boundary of Regions II 
and III. Perhaps the simplest definition of a “good job” in autarky is one that pays a wage above 
the average, i.e.  aa WW  . Holding productivity fixed at  0  , we see that trade threatens all and 
only good jobs. Controlling for firm productivity  0  , the highest paying jobs are those in Region 
I – all of which are lost in the opening to trade. The next highest paying jobs are those in Region 
II – some but not all of which will be lost to trade. Controlling for productivity, only the lowest   18
paying jobs survive the opening to trade. Indeed, trade leads to an expansion of these jobs and 
most sharply among the lowest paying of these (those along  0   in Region IV).  
  We see that the public perception that trade destroys good jobs at good wages does have 
foundation in the context of this model. Some workers who in autarky would enjoy high wages 
will find that a move to freer trade eliminates their jobs. Indeed, if we condition on productivity, 
trade always destroys the best jobs.  
  Having acknowledged this, it is also crucial to understand the limits of this way of 
thinking. Yes, trade will eliminate some of what workers perceive as good jobs, and conditioning 
on productivity, trade always destroys the best jobs. Yet this is perfectly consistent with the 
possibility that trade will simultaneously expand the number of high wage jobs sufficiently that 
the average wage will rise. Indeed, we will argue below why we think this is the normal case. 
The net gain for specific workers and for workers as a whole will then need to account for 
changes in prices and variety, which will typically be additional sources of gain, as well as for 
changes in aggregate unemployment. Moreover, in this model, all income accrues to labor. Good 
jobs are naturally very attractive to those who have them; however, the associated inefficiencies 
cost labor as a whole.  
  B. Changes in Structure and Scale 
  In the previous section, we abstracted from the possibility that liberalization may affect 
the average wage distortion, hence unemployment, so we turn to this now. The firm level wage 
distortion,  / ii Wm, is a constant, and so unaffected by liberalization. The average wage 
distortion across all firms is affected by the redistribution of output (including exit) across firm 
types that may have different levels of distortions. At any marginal cost, indexed by z , there 
exist firms with different wage distortions. While we can make specific predictions about which 
firms will exit according to the ordering by z , it is not possible to say whether the average wage 
distortion will rise or fall with liberalization without knowledge of the full joint distribution of 
 ,m  .
12 In short, 
*
/ Wm is a function of 
* z , but it need not be monotonic.  
  1. The Average Wage Distortion, Macro Effects, and the New Steady State 
  The macro implications of changes in the average wage distortion come directly from our 
heterogeneous firm model of efficiency wages: a rise in the average wage distortion raises   19
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. As 
discussed in Section II.B., a rise in the average wage distortion, through firm selection effects, 
raises the expected capital gain from moving between unemployment and employment, so makes 
unemployment less daunting, requiring a rise in the structural unemployment rate to maintain the 
balance of incentives to elicit effort.  
  This rise in unemployment relative to the case of no change in the average wage 
distortion changes the scale of the economy, but not its structure. Because of the general second 
best nature of the economy, we cannot rule out that with a sufficient rise in the unemployment 
rate, total real income may decline with liberalization, although we would consider this an 
unusual case. Similarly, even as the average price of products declines, there can be a rise in the 
economy’s price index because the rise in unemployment causes a decline in the total mass of 
varieties available in the market. The fact that the possibility of absolute losses might arise in a 
model with factor market distortions would not be surprising, although such an outcome in the 
world seems unlikely. 
  The rise in unemployment anticipated with the move from autarky to freer trade reduces 
the steady state mass of firms of each type relative to the previous case in which employment 
was unchanged. In principle, a sufficiently sharp rise in the average wage distortion, 
accompanied with a sharp rise in the required unemployment rate, could lead to a reduction of 
the presence even of the most productive export firm types in the new steady state and a loss in 
total employment there.
13  
                                                 
13 While the present paper develops only comparative steady states, it would be interesting to study transition 
dynamics for the case in which the rise in the average wage distortion, hence also the unemployment rate, in the new 
steady state requires a smaller mass even of the highly productive firm types. We conjecture that in this case the 
transition will feature overshooting of both the average wage and the unemployment rate along the path to the new 
steady state. The logic is simple. Apart from exogenous firm deaths, firm exits only arise when expected present 
discounted profits are negative. But firm profits are monotonically decreasing in marginal costs. Hence if the 
“crowding” of the market by the excess prevalence of low marginal cost firms during the transition relative to the 
steady state leads to exit, this exit will be among the highest marginal cost (small) firms. But if indeed these small 
firms are on average also the low wage distortion firms, then this change in composition will lead the average wage 
distortion to be higher in the transition than in the steady state. All else equal, the rise in the average wage distortion 
also requires a higher unemployment rate to insure effort, since the no-shirking constraints have to hold at all times. 
Our conjecture, then, is that both the average wage distortion and unemployment will overshoot in the transition to 
the new steady state. Confirming this conjecture is beyond the scope of the present paper.   20
 2.  Political  Economy  
  The main thrust of the political economy for comparative steady states from the view of 
firms can be understood through examination of Figure 1. As before, the move from autarky to 
freer trade divides the space into four key regions in terms of marginal costs. All firms with 
mc mc  , i.e. those in Regions I, II, and III, lose profits as a result of the move of comparative 
steady states from autarky to freer trade. Only the largest firms, those with mc mc   gain. 
Hence a move from autarky to freer trade should be supported only by the largest firms.  
  Turning to workers, we start with several general observations. Trade always serves to 
lower the typical price and may raise the total (local and imported) number of varieties available 
in the market to consumers. Hence typically the price index will fall in the move from autarky to 
freer trade, which is a gain to all workers.  
  Selection effects from liberalization may also alter the distribution of types of jobs in the 
economy. We have to treat distinctly three separate concepts, namely the average wage 
distortion, 
*
/ Wm, the average nominal wage, 
* W , and the general equilibrium impact on the 
average real income of workers. As we have noted, the unemployment rate is linked directly to 
the average wage distortion. We have seen at the firm level that a “good job”, i.e. one that pays a 
high wage (relatively) is one where this distortion is high. Yet when the average rises, 
unemployment rises, which is costly directly due to lost output and also due to associated loss of 
variety. While the average nominal wage in the economy seems likely to be positively associated 
with the average wage distortion, close examination reveals that this connection is not a 
necessary one. Still, we may expect that  
*
/ Wm and 
* W may typically move together, which 
would in such cases suggest a tradeoff between high unemployment and high average wages in 
the typical job. It is worth keeping in mind, though, that “good jobs” come at a price. Here all 
income accrues to workers, so that average real income to workers is maximized exactly when 
total real income is maximized. The distortions that give rise to “good jobs” here lower aggregate 
real income and so also lower the average real income of workers.  
  There are also important distributional effects – job loss will fall particularly heavily on 
some. Since firms in Region I exit and those in Region II contract output, all workers in Region I 
firms lose their jobs and some in Region II firms lose their jobs as well. It is interesting to   21
observe that although firms in Region III lose profits with the liberalization, workers there do not 
lose jobs, and so should have no reason to oppose liberalization on this basis.  
VI. Numerical Analysis 
Our model offers a rich set of predictions for how labor markets adjust to trade 
liberalization. In this section we simulate the model, using a calibration approach that identifies 
key parameters from the data and from previous estimates. The simulations establish the 
magnitude of effects identified in the model.
15  
  Previewing our numerical results, trade liberalization leads to little change in the 
unemployment rate, a rise in aggregate real income, and tremendous churning in the labor 
market, with the gross loss of as many as one-fourth of good jobs.  
  The numerical version of our model requires specification of the ex ante joint distribution 
of productivity and wages, as well as values for the other model parameters such as fixed and 
variable trade costs, fixed and sunk entry costs, and the elasticity of substitution.  The following 
sections explain our choices for these parameters in detail 
  A. The wage distribution 
In specifying the distribution of productivity and wages, we are guided by the large 
empirical literature on the firm size and wage distributions. This literature almost invariably 
models wages as log normal, and the firm size distribution as Pareto, so we do the same.  
A key parameter in our model is the dispersion of wage rents. As discussed in our 
introduction, Krueger and Summers (1988), among others, argued that large measured industry 
wage differentials were evidence of labor rents, while Murphy and Topel (1987) and others 
argued that unobserved heterogeneity in workers’ marginal products was responsible for industry 
wage differentials. A similar dispute arises in interpreting the well-documented correlation 
between firm size and wages (e.g. Brown and Medoff (1989), Idson and Oi (1999), Manning 
(2003, Chapter 4)). To resolve this dispute requires information on worker and firm 
characteristics, as well as enough “job switchers” to be able to reliably identify what component 
of a worker’s wage is due to her inherent productivity and what component is due to the firm 
where she works.  Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)  assembled data (a panel of French 
                                                 
15 All calculations were performed in Mathematica, and the programs are available on request.    22
workers and firms from 1976 to 1987) that can answer this question. Their conclusion is that the 
“person” effect is much more important than the “firm effect”: 
Virtually all of the inter-industry wage differential is explained by the variation in 
average individual heterogeneity across sectors. Person effects, and not firm effects, form 
the basis for most of the inter-industrial salary structure. (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 
1999, pg. 253) 
 
While this result can reasonably be interpreted as vindication for the view that labor rents are 
smaller than Krueger and Summers may have thought, “virtually all” does not mean all.  In their 
Table IV, middle panel, Abowd et al report their estimate of the standard deviation of the firm 
effect on log French wages as 0.06.
16  In our model the “firm effect” corresponds to wage 
variation due to variation in monitoring ability across firms, so we parameterize the marginal 
distribution of wages   w Fw  as being log normal with a standard deviation of 0.06.  
  B. The productivity distribution and elasticity of substitution 
Following many authors, we model the ex ante marginal distribution of unit labor 
requirements a  (where a = 
-1) as a Pareto distribution with shape parameter  and upper bound 
.  The Melitz (2003) model can be solved analytically with this distribution (Baldwin 2005), a 
set of results that we will refer to here as the “Pareto-Melitz” model.  Although our model has no 
analytic solution, the Pareto-Melitz model proves very useful in guiding our choices for five 
parameters: the Pareto shape parameter , the elasticity of substitution , the sunk cost of entry 
fe, the fixed cost of production f, and the fixed cost of exporting fx.  
Solution of the Pareto-Melitz model requires that  >  - 1 >0.  In choosing  and  to 
satisfy these restrictions, we follow two strategies.  The first relies on the literature on the firm 
size distribution, which generally finds values for  that are not much bigger than one. For 
example, Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2009) estimate that   ranges between 1.8 and 
2.5 across industries and European countries in 2000, with the larger industries having values 
close to 2.
17  Taking this value for   constrains us to a very low value of   = 2, despite the fact 
                                                 
16 We are referring here to Abowd et al’s parameter .  The estimate is 0.0685 for men, 0.0566 for women. The 
sample standard deviation of log wages is 0.519 and 0.480 for men and women respectively, so the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the firm effect to the standard deviation of log wage is 0.13 and 0.12 for men and women 
respectively. 
17 These numbers come from Table 7 in Corcos et al (2007).   23
that most estimates of  exceed 2 (for example, Harrigan (1993) estimates   to be between 5 
and 12, while Broda and Weinstein (2006) find median values of  greater than 2 ).   
Our second approach to choosing  and   follows Ghironi and Melitz (2005).  They use 
the analysis of 1992 U.S. plant level data by  Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) to 
calibrate their version of the Pareto-Melitz model, which implies  = 3.4,  = 3.8 (see Ghironi 
and Melitz (2005) for details).  This choice of parameters allows for a more realistic choice of  , 
although  = 3.4 is substantially higher than what is found by Corcos et al.  Thus there is an 
uncomfortable tension between the mathematical requirements of the model and the empirical 
evidence, regardless of the choice of  and .  We report results using both cases below. 
The Pareto upper bound parameter  is a normalization, set to 10 for numerical reasons. 
  C. Variable and fixed trade costs 
  Our measures of variable trade costs come from the influential survey by Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2004). Using U.S. and other data sources, the authors report that ad valorem 
equivalent trade costs are about 74 percent, which reflects the combined influence of border 
costs of 44 percent and transport costs (including the time cost of goods in transit) of 21 percent. 
Thus in our simulations, we take  = 1.74 as our measure of variable trade costs in the move 
from autarky to trade. We also report simulations that set all border barriers to zero, which 
implies  = 1.21. The difference between  = 1.74 and  = 1.21 is thus a measure of the effect of  
the removal of all border barriers.  
Turning to the choice of fixed costs, in the Pareto-Melitz model the entry and export 
choices depend respectively on the fixed cost ratios  e f f  and x f f .  To calibrate x f f , we use 




  . This share was 0.21 for U.S. plants 
in 1992, and the corresponding share for French firms in 2000 was 0.22 (see Bernard et al and 
Corcos et al respectively for these numbers). Setting  = 1.74, we back out  x f f  to match 0.215  
  The Pareto-Melitz model also delivers an expression for the share of firms that enter once 
they have paid the sunk cost  e f , and this share depends on  e f f .  However, there is no 
empirical counterpart to firms that do not enter, so there is no moment which we can use to back   24
out an estimate of e f f .  We rather uncomfortably choose  e f f = 0.2, which guarantees an 
interior solution given all of our other parameter values.  Fortunately, wide variation in the 
choice of  e f f  has almost no effect on our results. 
  D. Parameters of the efficiency wage model 
With wages given by draws from the distribution    w Fw , the associated values of 
monitoring costs are given by inverting equation (8).  To guide our choice of the remaining 
parameters of the efficiency wage model, we work with equation (15), which gives the 
equilibrium unemployment rate.  Along with the average distortion, the determinants of the 
equilibrium unemployment rate are the exogenous firm death rate , the utility cost of effort e, 
and the upper bound on monitoring efficiency m . Following Bernard et al and Corcos et al , we 
set  = 0.1 to match the annual hazard rate for U.S. plant exit. We choose e and m together so 
that the equilibrium unemployment rate is reasonable for an OECD country, which leads us to e 
= 1.0001 and m  = 2000.   
  E. Joint distribution of wages and productivity 
  With the marginal distributions for wages and productivity fixed by the considerations 
described above, it remains to model the joint distribution. We do so using the Ali-Mikhail-Haq 
copula, which specifies the joint cdf of wages w and unit labor requirements a as a function of 
the marginal cdfs and a parameter , 
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The degree of association between w and a is governed by , with independence 
corresponding to  = 0. We set  = -0.9, which implies a small ex ante correlation between 
productivity and wages of 0.144, and an ex post positive correlation between firm size and wages 
in equilibrium which is in line with the evidence discussed in section V.C above. For more on 
copulas and sampling from the above joint cdf, see Nelsen (2006). We also simulate our model 
for a zero ex ante correlation between wages and productivity,  = 0. 
  F. Numerical Results 
  Table 1 provides the results of our numerical simulations.  Each column compares 
autarky to restricted trade, covering both high ( 1.74   ) and low ( 1.21   ) trade cost cases. The 
top panel has  =  = 2, and the bottom top panel has  =3.8,  = 3.4.    25
  Focusing on the first column of numbers, the movement from autarky to current levels of 
trade costs ( 1.74   ) raises real GDP by 12 percent, an effect which combines an 18 percent 
improvement in aggregate productivity with a decline in variety of 6 percent.  The number of 
active firms is only 78 percent of the autarky level, an illustration of the powerful “survival of 
the fittest” mechanism in the Melitz model.  Turning to the elements that are new to our model, 
the unemployment rate of 7 percent doesn’t budge when the economy opens up.  Workers who 
maintain their old jobs see their real wages increase by 11 percent due to the fall in the price 
level, but many workers do lose their jobs: 15 percent of “good jobs” (jobs with above average 
wages in autarky) are lost, while 19 percent of “bad jobs” are eliminated.  Thus while the 
average worker is much better off than under autarky, there is a substantial reallocation of job 
rents.  The effects of further reductions in trade costs are even larger: real GDP is 24 percent 
higher than under autarky, but more than a fifth of autarky good jobs are eliminated.   
  Our baseline parameterization includes a small ex ante correlation of 0.144 between 
wages and productivity, which leads to a size-wage correlation of 0.05 with current levels of 
trade costs, in line with the evidence reported in Manning (2003) discussed above.
19  We modify 
this assumption in the second two columns of Panel A, and with the exception of the size wage 
correlation which is now very small and negative, our results about the aggregate and 
distributional effects of trade liberalization are virtually unchanged.  The only notable difference 
is that job losses are now a bit more heavily concentrated in “good jobs”, since these high-wage 
jobs are less likely to be at highly productive firms than in the baseline parameterization.  
  The second panel of the table tells much the same story, except that all the effects of 
liberalization are quite a bit smaller.  For example, in the move from autarky to current levels of 
trade costs, only 5 percent of “good jobs” are lost as opposed to 15 percent in our baseline.  
Unemployment in this panel is 10 or 11 percent, which is somewhat high by U.S. standards but 
very much in line with levels in France and elsewhere in Europe (recall that many of our 
parameters are drawn from French and other European data).  The intuition for why larger values 
of  and  lead to smaller effects of liberalization is that firms have both less market power 
(larger ) and a more skewed productivity distribution (larger ) than when  and  are small, so 
                                                 
19 We refer here to Manning’s Table 4.2, pg.87, which reports that the estimated elasticity of wages with respect to 
employer size is anywhere between 0.013 and 0.145. An estimate of 0.04 seems to be preferred.   26
that there are fewer small, inefficient firms in autarky. Thus the selection effects of trade 
liberalization that are at the heart of the Melitz model are less powerful.  
  Figure 3 illustrates the employment effects of liberalization in our simulation.  For the 
purpose of understanding Figure 3 it is useful to think of each dot as representing an active firm 
in autarky, although strictly speaking the dots are draws from a continuous joint distribution.
21  
The firms that expand employment are exporters, and the dispersion of this cloud reflects the 
long, thin upper tail of the Pareto productivity distribution. The cluster of firms just to the left of 
the vertical axis are firms that survive the opening to trade but do not export: instead, they shed 
workers in the face of import competition.  Finally, the cluster of firms to the  far left shut down 
and layoff their labor force when trade opens up. The key message illustrated by the figure is that 
workers with the same wages can suffer very dissimilar fates: their firm can shut down, contract, 
or expand (possibly a lot) when the economy opens to trade. A related message is that among the 
three categories of firms (those that exit, import competing, and exporters) there is great 




  How do labor markets adjust to trade liberalization? The experience of major trade 
liberalizations underscores the importance of intra-industry reallocations. First generation models 
of intra-industry liberalization, based on Krugman (1981), emphasize that such integration will 
be smooth: no firm goes out of business, no worker loses a job, and welfare rises for everyone as 
the price index falls owing to variety gains. In such a world, liberalization should command 
universal approval. Of course, trade liberalization in reality remains highly controversial, with 
overwhelming majorities in the United States saying that it costs jobs and lowers wages.  
  A new generation of intra-industry trade models, based on Melitz (2003), provides an 
opening to make sense of these facts. In a benchmark case for the new models, the Krugman 
variety gains disappear entirely, even though consumers value variety. All of the gains come 
                                                 
21 For aesthetic reasons, Figure 3 is constructed by drawing 5,000 times from F(w,a), rather than the more 
numerically accurate sample of 20,000 draws used to construct Table 1.  Parameters are those used in the first 
column in Table 1.   27
through the product market churning that expands output at high productivity firms and leads 
low productivity firms to contract or exit.  
  Our innovation is to link this product market churning to labor market churning, while 
giving workers a reason to care about their jobs. We do this by merging the Melitz model with a 
variant of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of efficiency wages. In this model, workers care about job 
loss for two reasons. First, and in contrast to Melitz, there is involuntary unemployment, so job 
loss may give rise to a spell without work or wages. Second, different jobs pay different wages to 
identical workers, so that a worker with a particularly good job (high wage) may reasonably fear 
that displacement from that job will result in eventual re-employment only at a lower wage. Of 
course, idiosyncratically high wages at a job, all else equal, also make that job more vulnerable 
in the face of liberalization. Hence this also helps us to make sense of public concerns of trade 
costing jobs and lowering wages.  
  We develop a simulation of our model based on the best available parameter estimates. 
We find quite substantial aggregate gains in our simulations. While unemployment exists in our 
model, it is little affected by liberalization. However, there is a tremendous amount of labor 
market churning. In one experiment, up to one-fourth of all “good” (above average wage) jobs 
are destroyed. Given best estimates of the magnitude of the firm-specific component of wages, 
this could lead many to lose as a result of liberalization.  
  In short, we have developed a model of intra-industry exchange in which the combination 
of labor market churning and job specific rents can make sense of public concerns that trade 
costs jobs and lowers wages. The model explains this in a context that continues to feature large 
aggregate gains common in intra-industry models.   28
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Figure 1 
Autarky to Freer Trade 
 
 
The move from autarky to free trade changes the marginal firms from those with marginal costs 
*
a mc  to 
* mc . This leads to exit of the high marginal cost firms in Region I; contraction of the next highest 
marginal cost firms in Region II; and expansion of low marginal cost firms in Regions III and IV as they 
enter new export markets. Profits drop to zero in Region I firms and decline for firms in Regions II and 
III. The Region III firms experience the profit decline in spite of their success in exporting – the loss of 
local market share and the fixed costs of exporting are not compensated by the new profits in the foreign 
market. Only the super-exporting firms in Region IV experience higher profits. Job loss occurs wherever 
output contracts, namely in Regions I and II.   
i   
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A Conditional Threat to “Good Jobs at Good Wages” 
 
A good job may be defined as one that pays more than the average wage in autarky. For illustrative 
purposes, consider a productivity level  0   that corresponds to the point at which the average autarky 
wage curve crosses the boundary between Regions II and III. Conditional on productivity level  0  , the 
highest wages on offer are at jobs in Region I firms; all of these good jobs are destroyed in the move from 
autarky to free trade. The next highest wages are on offer at jobs in Region II firms; some of these jobs 
are lost as output contracts. The Region III jobs expand, but these are bad jobs. The sharpest expansion of 
jobs occurs at the Region IV firms offering the worst jobs. These Region IV firms offering the worst jobs 
are also the only ones who increase profits in the move from autarky to free trade. Conditional on this 
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Simulations of the Model for High and Low Trade Costs 
 
Panel A:  = 2,  = 2 








  ex ante (productivity,wage) >0 ex ante (productivity,wage) =0
Trade relative to autarky values 
Real  GDP  1.12 1.24 1.12 1.24 
Productivity  1.18 1.34 1.17 1.34 
Active Local Firms  0.78  0.64  0.79  0.64 
Price  Index  0.89 0.81 0.89 0.80 
Unemployment  Rate  1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Levels 
Share of exporters  0.21  0.43  0.21  0.44 
Autarky Unemploy.   0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Trade Unemployment   0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Autarky (Size,Wage)  0.07  0.07  0.00  0.00 
Trade (Size,Wage)  0.05  0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
Share of jobs lost in move to trade 
Good  Jobs  0.15 0.22 0.16 0.25 
Bad  Jobs  0.19 0.29 0.17 0.26 
 
Panel B:  = 3.8,  = 3.4 








  ex ante (productivity,wage) >0 ex ante (productivity,wage) =0
Trade relative to autarky values 
Real  GDP  1.04 1.13 1.04 1.13 
Productivity  1.01 1.07 1.01 1.07 
Active Local Firms  0.88  0.67  0.88  0.66 
Price  Index  0.96 0.89 0.96 0.89 
Unemployment  Rate  1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Levels 
Share of exporters  0.22  0.75  0.23  0.75 
Autarky Unemploy.   0.11  0.11  0.10  0.10 
Trade Unemployment   0.11  0.11  0.10  0.10 
Autarky (Size,Wage)  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.02 
Trade (Size,Wage)  0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Share of jobs lost in move to trade 
Good  Jobs  0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 
Bad  Jobs  0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 
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Notes to Table 1: The high and low trade costs respectively are  = 1.74 and  = 1.21.  The 
notation (.,.) indicates the correlation coefficient. The ex ante correlation between productivity 
and the wage is 0.144 in columns 1 and 2 (the two cases correspond to  = -0.9 and  = 0 
respectively).  All other parameters identical across cases, with the exception of the export fixed 
cost fX ,which is chosen to generate a share of exporters = 0.215 when  = 1.74 (resulting in fX = 
1.24 in Panel A and fX = 0.75 in Panel B).  Simulation computed using 20,000 draws from ex 
ante joint distribution of wages and productivity.  Common parameter values are 
ex ante standard deviation of log wages  W  0.06 
scale parameter on Pareto distribution    10 
utility cost of effort  e  1.0001 
upper bound monitoring hazard rate  m   2000 
exogenous firm death hazard rate    0.1 
fixed entry cost  fe  5 
fixed production cost  f  1 
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Figure 3 
 








wages vs. change in employment
 
 
Notes to Figure 3:  Each dot represents a firm active in autarky, its’ wage, and the employment 
response when trade costs fall from  =  to  =1.74 for  =  = 2,  = -0.09 (the case 
corresponding to the first column of Panel A in Table 1).  The set of points to the far left are 
firms that shut down when trade opens up, the set of firms just left of the vertical axis are firms 
that survive but do not export, while the dots to the right represent exporters. The scale on the 
horizontal axis is arbitrary, but the relative magnitudes are meaningful. 
 
 